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STATE "BILLS OF RIGHTS": A CASE OF NEGLECT AND
THE NEED FOR A RENAISSANCE
ROBERT FORCE*
Fantasia
Time: Some date in the not too distant future;
Place: A state capitol during a meeting of the State Constitutional
Revision Commission.***
Chairman: "Mr. Witness, what changes, if any, should be made in
our Bill of Rights ?"
Witness: "It should be repealed."
Chairman: "But Mr. Witness, basic individual rights are protected
there. We have always had a state Bill of Rights."
Witness: "Let's not confuse utility or necessity with history or
sentimentality.1 State Bills of Rights are obsolete. The United States
Supreme Court has incorporated most of the first eight amendments to
the United States Constitution into the Fourteenth Amendment and made
them applicable to the states. Thus, the basic rights of speech, press,
religion, self-incrimination, counsel, etc., are protected by the national
constitution and the United States Supreme Court. The state Bills of
Rights have been superseded. No one pays any attention to them any-
more; lawyers don't even cite them in their briefs now. A state con-
stitution should be streamlined. The Bill of Rights has to go !"
The persuasiveness of these remarks had its effect. A constitutional
amendment in the form of repealer was submitted to the electorate and
passed by a narrow margin, although it seems that most voters did not
understand the difference between the national and state Bills of Rights
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Indianapolis Law School.
1. Ernst Freund in Standards of American Legislation states:
This does not mean that there is not sufficient sentimental attachment to the
bills of rights to muster ample support in their defense if they should be seriously
attacked. The sentimental attachment also has a very real political value; for the
belief in the ideals of liberty is one of the chief elements in the stability of
American institutions, and creates a fundamental political contentment under
governmental imperfections which is hardly rivaled in countries where a tech-
nically more perfect government is provided by less popular authority.
E. FREuND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 114 (1917).
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and believed they were overturning many of the recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.
INTRODUCTION
The work of the United States Supreme Court during the past
fifteen years in the areas of conflict between the states and individuals
has raised serious questions about the future role and responsibility of
the states with regard to individual rights. While it is "in" today to
formulate questions in terms of morbidity (Is Religion Dead?), this
seems to result too often in self-fulfilling prophesies. If the subject is not
dead already, questions framed in this style can help to kill it. Thus, the
thesis of this paper is that states in the past have played an important,
although far from ideal, role in the protection of individual rights and
must be prepared to play an even more important role in the future.
This paper will examine state protection of individual rights in
four parts: 1) federalism and individual rights; 2) a comparison
of state and national Bills of Rights provisions; 3) evaluation of
illustrative rights and their treatment on national and state levels; and 4)
recent state activity in the Bill of Rights area.
FEDERALISM AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Federalism has come a long way since September 12, 1787 when at
a meeting of the Federal Convention, and in response to an inquiry about
the need to protect the right of trial by jury, Roger Sherman of Con-
necticut said: "The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this
Constitution; and being in force are sufficient."2 Starting with the
school desegregation cases in 1954 there has been an unparalleled concern
by the Supreme Court with problems involving state and local protection
or violation of individual rights. Since that time decisions in the area of
free speech and association, religion, criminal justice and civil rights have
characterized the work of the Court. More important than the results of
those cases is the method of reaching those results. Most often, the Court
has simply "incorporated" a relevant section of the first eight amendments
2. 2 M. FARRAND, U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1787 558 (Rev. ed. 1966).
Sherman made this point in the context of a discussion of the need for a provision,
on jury trials. He believed that national protection of rights was necessary only where
they were not adequately protected by the states.
In the same work, James Wilson explains:
Thus, Sir, it appears from the example of the other states, as well as from
principle, that a bill of rights is neither essential nor a necessary instrument
in framing a system of government since liberty may exist and be as well
secured without it. But it was not only unnecessary, but on this occasion it
was found impracticable-for who will be bold enough to undertake to
enumerate all the rights of the people?
3 M. FARRAND 143-44.
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to the United States Constitution into the Fourteenth Amendment,'
thus imposing limitations upon the states which had heretofore been
applicable only to the national government. The growing list of limitations
on ,state activity through the application of the Fourteenth Amendment has
raised the question of the need and utility of separate state Bills of
Rights. In a sense we have come full circle since 1787, when some men
questioned the need for a Federal Bill of Rights.'
This Supreme Court activity, has been part of an overall reallocation
of power and responsibility from the states to the national government
and more recently to the self-ruled megalopolis.' Even though state
power has also increased measurably during this period, this increase
seems negligible when compared to the growth of national and urban
power. The second part of the twentieth century may question not only
specific aspects of state responsibility and power, but the very utility of
states at all.
Whatever future the states have as viable governmental entities,
state and/or local responsibility for protecting individual rights need
not be substantially undermined by the two factors cited most for the
decline of the states: limited finances and obsolete government struc-
tures.' Much of the work in protecting individual rights requires
negation rather than assertion of power, and consists primarily in
judicial restraints on the exercise of government power. Furthermore,
the lesson of the Supreme Court "revolution" is that the
nation is no longer dependent upon ineffective or recalcitrant
states for the achievement of national policy. The states enjoy
rights and powers, both through Constitutional provision and
through practice, which permit them to play as important a role
in the governance of America as they may wish to play.'
Two novel factors seem to be furthering the deemphasis of state
responsibility in the individual rights area; one is a matter of public
3. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of Fourth Amendment rights); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962)
(right to appointed counsel in felony trials); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (right to appointed counsel on appeal); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
and Murphy v. Waterfront Commissioners, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (privilege against self-
incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses).
Speech had come in under Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) and religion at
least from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
4. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
5. "Through both presidential and, perhaps more important, Supreme
Court leadership, therefore, the current trend reinforces the secular tendency
toward increasing emphasis on national action." R. MARTIN, THE CITES AND THE
FEDaER. SYSTm 27 (1965). See also id. at 28, 192.
6. Id. at 37, 46.
7. Id. at 28.
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relations and the other is the current trend in law school pedagogy.
Simply stated, the United States Supreme Court has captured the fancy
of the mass media, hence the public at large.' And while feeling about
the Court runs the gamut, there is no denying that its decisions are news.
For example, when Indiana passes a statute providing for counsel in
probation revocation proceedings,' it goes virtually unnoticed. Yet, when
the Supreme Court reaches the same result" six months later, it is
national as well as local news.1 The Supreme Court tends to get "credit"
and "blame" for its decisions substantially exceeding the impact of those
decision on the law of some or many states. The personnel of the Supreme
Court are better known personalities than most local state supreme court
justices (even in their own bailiwicks) and it is a safe bet that within
any given state more people could name at least one justice of the United
States Supreme Court more readily than they could name a local state
supreme court justice.
The second subject, the current trend in law school pedagogy,
because it touches upon teaching techniques and tools, is by definition a
sensitive area. In the past fifteen years, paralleling the Supreme Court
activities in the "rights" areas, law school teaching materials and
scholarly legal research have emphasized these activities virtually to the
exclusion of state cases and statutes, except where they serve as negative
examples. Case books on constitutional law, criminal procedure and even
local government contain little or no state materials relating to state
protection of individual rights. This lack of state research and source
materials has already been referred to by other authors in at least two law
journal articles.' Of course there are some justifiable reasons for this
narrowing of attention. Supreme Court decisions are universally ap-
plicable, may in some instances be better reasoned and researched,
and are easily accessible. Yet, without being aware of it, these
8. On national network television there have been several special programs
relating directly or indirectly to the Court and its work. Most recently a one-hour
"special" in prime time featured Justice Black. Periodicals, too, have devoted more
space in recent years to "Law," with one recently adding a regular section which quite
often discusses the personalities and decisions of the Supreme Court. In the same vein,
the New York Times covers the decisions of the Court with its own special reporter
as well as any non-legal publication.
9. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2211 (Supp. 1968).
10. Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
11. The decision to extend the right to counsel to probation revocation proceedings
represents more of a technical development than one which would be of general interest
to the public. Nevertheless, it still was well reported to the public at large. See
generally, New York Times, Nov. 14, 1967, at 26, Col.3. This article, covering one
column, in listing the states which had already extended the right, omitted Indiana.
12. Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, UTAH L. Rxv.
326, 327-28 (1966); Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment
Rights, 4 VAND. L. REv. 620 (1950).
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materials are "conditioning" and stimulating students to think
only in terms of the national Bill of Rights, the United States Supreme
Court and federal legislation as the sources of power and responsibility
for protecting individual rights. References to state activity is generally
negative, with statutes being struck down and courts reversed. Law
students inevitably become lawyers and as such eventually absorb some
state materials, but it would be nothing short of miraculous if federal
precedents did not invariably serve as the basic point of departure in their
practice.
All of the above is even more remarkable when one realizes that
the United States Supreme Court has been more or less a "Johnny-
Come-Lately" in protecting individual rights.'" However, in giving some
credit to the states, no criticism of the Supreme Court is intended. The
recent decisions by the Court have pointed up and attacked abuses of
individual rights which were not protected by a few or many, as the case
may be, state courts. This, however, does not mean that individual rights
are now completely protected, nor that future Courts will be as aggressive
about such rights has the Warren Court. The Court has unquestionably
entered the area, and, in the future, can be expected to play some role
in safeguarding individual rights. This paper suggests that in the long
run, it will be better to construe Supreme Court decisions involving
conflicts between individuals and states as providing for all states only
a floor or minimum level of protection. 5 There is a danger, if the
Court's decisions come to be regarded as ultimates or if the Court is
viewed as having "occupied the areas," that all states will surrender what
initiative they have in the "rights" area and will be discouraged from
going further in protecting those rights than the Court has gone.
Furthermore, in pointing with approval to some state activity in the
13. The word "conditioning" is not used here in its technical, psychological sense.
14. Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 249
(1968). Pye, in describing pre-Warren Courts, says,
In general, the Court concerned itself primarily with federal criminal cases;
review of state criminal judgments was limited to a small group of cases each
year, the most important of which frequently involved the admission of confes-
sions or the question whether a defendant had been seriously disadvantaged by
denial of counsel. In every year but one, the number of federal criminal
cases greatly exceeded the number of cases reviewed from state courts, and
this situation was not reversed until 1961.
id. at 255.
15. MARTIN, supra note 5, at 39. In discussing "cooperative federalism," Martin
states:
[T]he practice, of cooperation has combined national standards with state and
local responsibility for administration. This has had the effect of placing a
floor under performance without destroying local responsibility for what have
been, in impact at least, local problems.
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individual rights area, there is a tendency to misconstrue such approval
as overall satisfaction. Nothing could be further from the truth. But it is
equally misleading to dismiss all of the states as irresponsible or irrelevant
merely because all or most states have not been aggressive in protecting
every right. Some states have good records on certain issues in which they
have preceded or gone further 6 than the Supreme Court. This in itself
ought to be recognized as both significant and desirable. It is in this
latter respect, because of a lack of uniformity, that state activity in the
individual rights area has largely been overlooked and underestimated.
The Common Law of Constitutional Law
In the past fifteen or so years we seem to have lost sight of the fact
that most Bill of Rights provisions, national and state, were creatures or
idealizations of, and sometimes reactions to, common law principles.'
The development of individual rights under Bills of Rights has been a
cooperative, common law-like effort by federal and state courts. Early
writers on constitutional law, when discussing such problems as free
speech or religion or self-incrimination or counsel, freely mixed federal
16. See notes 142-241 infra and accompanying text.
17. Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, 20 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 183-229, 347-96 (1945). Dean Pound, in Part III, states:
Five ideas were assumed by American lawyers of the time of the Revolution,
and by our lawyers of the nineteenth century, as involved in government
according to law in contrast to absolute monarchy. They were: (1) The idea
of a fundamental law, the "law of the land," to which all official and govern-
mental action was bound to conform, which law was to be applied by the
courts in the course of orderly litigation according to the common law, and
could be invoked against officials by any one aggrieved. (2) The idea of
immemorial rights of Englishmen, secured by the law of the land, and of the
common law in which they were recognized as the birthright of Englishmen
and so of Americans. Coke's Second Institute speaks of the law of the land
as the "best inheritance that the subject hath" and is full of old law-French
maxims expressing that idea. (3) The idea of authoritative declarations of
these rights in charters and bills of rights. Indeed, there was a precedent for a
written constitution, such as all Americans believed in after independence,
in the Instrument of Government adopted under the Commonwealth in 1653.
It contained a few declarations of fundamental rights and provided "that all
laws, statutes, ordinances, and clauses in any law statute and ordinance, to
the contrary of the aforesaid liberty shall be esteemed null and void." (4)
The idea of an independent judiciary, as set forth in the English Bill of Rights
of 1688, to administer the fundamental law, and of lawmaking by a body
distinct from the executive. (5) The idea of courts refusing to apply statutes
in contravention of the fundamental law; an idea made familiar not only by
the seventeenth-century cases which the lawyers found in the Abridgments, or
Digests of reported decisions, and reports, but also by appeals to the Privy
Council in which statutes were held to conflict with colonial charters or to
run counter to provisions in charters for legislation in accordance with or
not repugnant to the common law.
Id. at 353-54.
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and state cases." Early federal and state courts were not in the least
reluctant to refer to the common law history of certain rights,' " nor
to cite English cases as support.2 While incorporation of common law
concepts into Bills of Rights may have idealized various rights, the con-
clusion is inescapable that more than anything these Bills of Rights
represented a common law legacy. 1 In some cases of course, Bills of
Rights surpassed the common law and even rejected it. But the common
law, either by incorporation, modification or rejection, was the principal
point of departure. Every schoolboy knows that the colonists complained
of not being afforded the basic rights of Englishmen.
This common law identification with constitutional rights, while it
may take away some of their wonder, provides the best historical basis
for an expanding view of individual rights.2 Some of the early as well
as contemporary federal and state cases illustrate that expansion of rights
occurred, in part, because judges were and are willing to be persuaded
by the decisions in sister jurisdictions, even when construing and applying
constitutional principles. For example, Johnson v. Zerbst" established
the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in federal pro-
secutions. That case relies primarily on Patton v. United States4 and
quotes significant language from it. However, a reading of Patton
reveals that the statement quoted in Zerbst appears in Patton as a
18. Cooley, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS chs. X-XIII (5th ed. 1883). In that
book, English precedent and federal and state cases are presented in conglomerate
form to support the distinguished author's analysis of individual rights.
19. See generally, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); People ex rel.
Brown v. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 How. Prac. (N.Y.) (Sup. Ct. 1885).
20. Id.
21. Pound, supra note 17.
22. Pound, referring to Magna Carta, states:
In characteristic English fashion it put them concretely in the form of a body
for specific provisions for present ills, not a body of general declaration in
universal terms. Herein, perhaps, is the secret of its enduring vitality. Like
the Constitution of the United States it is a great legal document. Like the
Constitution it lent itself to development by lawyer's technique. * * * When
recent historians, affecting to overthrow the lawyer's conception, tell us that
its framer meant no more than to remedy this or that exact grievance of a
time and place and class by a particular legal provision framed to the
exigencies of that grievance, they tell us no more than that the method of
the Great Charter is the method of English law in all ages. The frame of
mind in which it was drawn was nothing less than the frame of mind of the
common-law lawyer....
Pound, supra note 17, at 198-99.
23. Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and other
parts of our fundamental charter, this Court has pointed to "the humane
policy of the modern criminal law . . ." which now provides that a defendant,
"if he be poor, . . . may have counsel furnished him by the state . . . not
infrequently ... more able than the attorney for the state."
304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
24. 281 U.S. 276, 308 (1930).
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quotation from Hack v. State,25 a case decided by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. The states by and large were well ahead of the Supreme Court
on right to counsel at the time of Zerbst, and it is not surprising then
to find state constitutional standards being accepted on the federal level.
It was equally appropriate for the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wain-
wright" to use the Zerbst rationale as part of its decision requiring the
few laggard states to come into line. What is important is not "which
came first-federal or state rule" but the interplay between the two and
the real role of state decisions as an important part of the basis for Gideon.
In search and seizure a different process of acceptance occurred.
In Weeks v. United States," the first case given clear credit for applying
the exclusionary rule to unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme
Court cited as authority two earlier federal cases,28 which in turn rely
primarily on English cases for support. The first Indiana case29 to apply
the exclusionary rule adopts the Weeks rationale not because it was
bound to do so, but because it was persuaded that the development in
Weeks represented a better and more correct application of law.
Use of Statutes
Another factor often overlooked in constitutional law is the use of
statutes to implement individual rights. Several writers have referred to
the lack of state cases in particular areas involving individual rights and
have concluded that this might represent either a lack of protection or
a lack of concern on the state level."0 Undoubtedly this is true on some
occasions,3" but at times the converse is true. 2 A state, because it has
greater freedom to do so, may use legislation, rather than judicial deci-
sions, to implement or expand constitutional rights.
Activity on the federal level does not provide an analogy, since the
national government has no general police power and has always had to
rely on the commerce, tax and appropriations powers as indirect police
power sources. Thus, there was such doubt over various provisions of the
Congressional Civil Rights Act of 1866 that the Fourteenth Amendment
was passed to dispel these doubts.3 Remember too, the first Civil Rights
25. 141 Wis. 346, 351-52, 124 N.W. 492, 494 (1910).
26. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
27. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
28. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) and Brain v. United States, 168
U.S. 532 (1897).
29. Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 191, 138 N.E. 817 (1922).
30. Mazor, supra note 12; Paulsen, supra note 12.
31. This is partizularly true with First Amendment rights. Paulsen, supra note
12, at 642; Twomley, The Indiana Bill of Rights, 20 IND. L.J. 211, 222-24 (1944).
32. See notes 142-252 injra and accompanying text.
33. Gussman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 1323 (1952).
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cases invalidated portions of the Civil Rights Act applicable to private
individuals on the ground that this was beyond the power of Congress.84
The public accommodations section of a more recent Civil Rights Act
passed its constitutional test by reliance on the commerce power.?
On the other hand, the states, as possessors of general police
powers, have not, by and large, been so limited. The previously cited86
reference to counsel in probation revocation proceedings illustrates a
difference in methods to accomplish the same objective; Indiana secured
the right by legislation while the Supreme Court did it by litigation. With
no general police power vested in Congress, it comes as no surprise to
find "national constitutional law" embodied almost exclusively in United
States Supreme Court decisions. By contrast, the states, with broader
legislative authority, might be expected to rely more on legislation.
Legislation as a source or means for safeguarding individual rights has
been used extensively by Parliament and, at least in terms of legislative
power, the states more nearly resemble Parliament than Congress.8"
Additionally, because they emanate from the direct representatives of the
people, statutes may represent a more basic commitment to rights which
they embody or implement.
Disregarding this common law history, cooperative development and
legislation tend to minimize state activity in the "rights" area. Focusing
almost exclusively on the Federal Bill of Rights and the decisions of the
Supreme Court cannot help but result in, from the state view, frustration,
34. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
35. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
36. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
37. The primary source of constitutional law are statutes and decided cases.
Legislation is an obvious source and while some statutes are of great importance,
the statute books contain nothing like a code of Constitutional law but most of
the great landmarks-for example, Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Act of
Settlement, the Parliament Act, 1911, and the Statute of Westminister 1931-are
there.
R IDGEs, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6 (DeForrest ed. 1950) (emphasis added).
Yet all these liberties, in England, are admittedly at the mercy of a party
majority in parliament. * * * Englishmen may well feel that, in spite of the
American Constitution, there is less liberty in the United States than in
England. * * * The guarantee of these rights in parliament, lies in the procedure
of the House of Commons-its conventions and standing orders.
GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAWS IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 211 (1955).
Cf. Mazor, supra note 12, at 348.
For some reason though, in this country, statutes have come to be viewed as
something apart from constitutional law, whereas in the English tradition they some-
times represent its best examples. Statutes may be no less permanent than cases
(as statutes are repealed, cases are overruled), and in a sense, because they emanate
from the direct representatives of the people, may represent a more basic commitment
to rights which they embody or implement. E.g., Bill of Rights, 1688 1 W. & M. sess.
2, c. 2; Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1962) (provision relating to right of counsel).
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feelings of irrelevancy and, occasionally, the diminishment of rights.8
Burke Marshall, who was formerly in charge of the Civil Rights Division,
Department of Justice, made the following statement in Federalism
and Civil Rights:
This has led in the past three years to the greatest single source
of frustration with and misunderstanding of the federal govern-
ment, particularly among young people. They cannot understand
federal inactions in the face of what they consider, often quite
correctly, as official wholesale local interference with the
exercise of federal Constitutional rights. Apparently their
schools and universities have not taught them much about the
working of the federal system. In their eyes the matter is
simple. Local authorities are depriving certain people of their
federal Constitutional rights, often in the presence of federal
officials from the Justice Department. Persons doing this should
be protected.3
Marshall was illustrating another point in regard to civil rights, but the
statement illustrates the general shift in focus, growing demands upon
national authorities, and the national government's inability on many
occasions to satisfy those demands. These feelings of frustration easily
escalate to generalizations about all states and overstatements as to state
unresponsiveness.
Recently during the work of an Indiana legislative subcommittee
charged with the responsibility for reviewing the state Bill of Rights
as part of a constitutional revision study, several distinguished and
experienced persons suggested conforming the state provisions to the
Federal Bill of Rights. The Model State Constitution0 published by the
National Municipal League substantially takes the same approach. While
some convenience might result from such conformity, it also might foster
a limited, non-innovative or even abdicating attitude on the part of the
states. Conformity implicitly limits individual rights to those enumerated
in the Federal Bill of Rights and tends to place exclusive reliance on the
United States Supreme Court in developing the full breadth of all
rights. The states need only play follow the leader and go no further
than the Supreme Court has gone. An example from New York illustrates
one danger in this approach. The New York Constitution prohibited
38. See notes 142-241 infra and accompanying text.
39. B. MARSHALL, FEDEALISM AND CiviL RIGHTS 49 (1964).
40. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 1-3 (Sixth ed.
1963).
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direct and indirect financial aid to denominational schools,"' and this
provision was generally regarded as going beyond the restrictions in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 Consequently,
New York Courts in applying the New York Constitution rejected the
"child welfare" doctrine and declared unconstitutional both the trans-
portation 3 and supply of books44 to parochial school students. These
cases preceded the Supreme Court cases of Cochran v. Board of Educa-
tion"5 and Everson v. Board of Education" which held that the "child
welfare" doctrine did not violate the First Amendment. Subsequently, the
New York Constitution was amended to permit transporation of paro-
chial school students.4 Most recently, a majority of the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the lending of books to parochial school
students. 8 In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals overruled
the prior New York cases which rejected the "child welfare" doctrine
and cited as authority the Everson case and another Supreme Court
decision, Zorach v. Caluson,49 both of which were First-Fourteenth
Amendment cases. Thus, what had been recognized as a provision going
beyond the First Amendment in separating church and state was limited
to conform to the First Amendment.
COMPARISON OF STATE AND NATIONAL
BILLS OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS
Two different views of the adequacy of state Bills of Rights were
expounded when the need for a Federal Bill of Rights was being con-
sidered. Sherman's view, previously referred to,"0 was essentially that the
major responsibility for safeguarding individual rights lay in the states,
and that relevant state provisions were in most respects adequate.
Madison, however, took the opposite view:
41. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 9, § 4 (1894) :
Neither the State nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its property or credit
or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or
indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other for examination or inspection, of any
school or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction
of any religious denomination, or in which any denomination, tenet or doctrine
is taught.
42. 10 N.Y. TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS 18 (1967).
43. Judd v. Bd. of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
44. Smith v. Donohue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (3d Dept. 1922).
45. 281 U.S. 370 (1928).
46. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
47. N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 4 (renumbered art. 11, § 4 and amended in 1938 to
allow busing of all children).
48. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.S.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1967).
49. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
50. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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[S]ome states have no Bills of Rights [four states had
none], there are others provided with very defective ones, and
there are others whose Bill of Rights are not only defective,
but absolutely improper; instead of securing some in the ful!
extent which republican principles would require, they limit
them too much to agree with the common ideas of liberty.5'
Judge Dumbauld52 tells us that in 1879 seven states had Bills of
Rights provisions; four states, while they had no Bills of Rights per se,
did have in their constitutions provisions of the type usually found in
Bills of Rights; and two states still operating under their colonial
charters had no constitutions at all.
Madison was the principal draftsman of the Federal Bill of Rights"
and it seems evident that he drew upon existing provisions in various
state constitutions, especially that of his own state, Virginia. In 1879,
five states had provisions asserting the freedom and inalienable rights
of men54 and eight states affirmed the people as the source of govern-
mental power, 5 with seven states reserving the right in the people to
change their form of government. 6 Seven states had provisions relating
to frequent and free elections57 and eight prohibited taxation without
consent."
'Many of the states had provisions relating to the rights of criminal
defendants. For example, eight provided for the accused to be informed
as to the nature of the charge against him, to be confronted by witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process for witnesses, the privilege
51. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1879), cited in Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the
States, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761, 763 (1961).
52. Dumbauld, State Precedents For the Bill of Rights, 7 J. PUB. L. 323, 325
(1958). Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsyl-
vania and Virginia had Bills of Rights. Vermont also enacted a Bill of Rights, but it was
not yet a state. New Jersey, Georgia, New York and South Carolina had constitutional
protections. Connecticut and Rhode Island had no constitutions.
53. Id. at 323; see also BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1965).
54. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia. Footnotes
54 through 71 in this paper are derived from Dumbauld, supra note 52, at 343-44
which, in an Appendix, lists the various topics covered in the existing state Bills of
Rights.
55. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsy-
lvania, Vermont, Virginia.
56. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
Virginia.
57. Frequent: Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, Virginia. Free: Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia.
58. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsy-
lvania, Vermont, Virginia.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1969], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss2/1
STATE "BILLS OF RIGHTS"
against self-incrimination and a prohibition against general warrants.59
Five required a speedy trial,6" seven by a jury of the vicinage" and six
the right to counsel.62 Seven states provided that proceedings were to be
conducted according to "the law of the land."6 Freedom of the press was
secured in eight states as was the free exercise of religion."' There were
also prohibitions in five states against ex post facto laws," and in four
states prohibitions against quartering of troops. 6 The right to bear arms
was secured in four states, 7 the right of assembly and petition in seven 8
and freedom of debate in four." There were also a series of miscellaneous
protections which existed in but a few states, such as prohibitions against
double jeopardy, 0 compensation for taking of property,7 ' etc.
Presently, with almost four times the original thirteen states, every
state has a constitution and every state has a Bill of Rights.72 These
Bills of Rights, while strikingly similar particulalry in substance, are not
completely uniform either in the specific rights included, or in the
language used to define the various rights.
Most of the states include provisions expressing the philosophy
which prevailed during the movement for independence and nationhood.
In language drawing heavily on the Declaration of Independence, these
provisions acknowledge the inalienable rights of all men" and the inherent
right of political power74 in the people, with many states reserving the
right in the people to alter, modify or revoke their form of government."
59. Id.
60. Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia.
61. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
Virginia.
62. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont.
63. Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, Virginia.
64. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsy-
lvania, Vermont, Virginia.
65. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina.
66. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire.
67. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont.
68. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsy-
lvania, Vermont.
69. Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont.
70. New Hampshire.
71. Massachusetts, Vermont.
72. At the Conclusion of this paper an Appendix contains a chart of all of the
state Bills of Rights provisions and identifies each provision by the appropriate Article
and section number. Footnotes 72 through 141 were derived from the Appendix. All of
the state constitutions may be found in Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia
University, Constitutions of the United States-National and State (1962).
73. Every state has such a provision except Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Washington.
74. Every state has such a provision except Delaware, New York and Wyoming.
75. E.g., Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Tennessee, Texas.
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Only Louisianam and Wyoming,7 however, capture the essence of a Bill
of Rights in a society characterized by representative government:
"Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of free
men exists no where in a republic, not even in the largest majority.""8
Every state provides for the protection of some or all of the rights
usually referred to as First Amendment rights. All states, with varying
degrees of generality or specificity, guarantee the free exercise of religion
and freedom of the press. However twelve states" have no language
which could reasonably be construed as prohibiting the establishment of
religion; and four states8" omit any specific reference to free speech. It
is characteristic of most state Bills of Rights to provide substantially
more detail on religious freedom and non-establishment than is found in
the First Amendment. Some states8 provide that religious views shall
not be a basis for denial of civil or political rights. About half of the
states82 prohibit the expenditure of public funds for various religious
purposes. With respect to provisions on religion, it is sometimes difficult
to determine the exact reach of the provisions. Some states merely say
that the legislature shall establish "no religious test." But whether this
includes office, employment, witness, etc., cannot be immediately ascer-
tained from the provision itself. Also, while some states specifically state
that no public money is to be expended for religious purposes, others
merely provide that no person shall be required to "support" any religion;
and some say that no one shall be taxed for any religion. As to the
"tax" language, one might argue that since this is the primary source
of state funds, it means the same as no appropriation of funds for religious
purposes. Those provisions merely referring to "support," however, are
too difficult to interpret from the face of the document itself. Many of
these considerations are not really relevant because even the relatively
clear "no appropriation" language has been construed to allow some
financial assistance to parochial school students.8" The rights to assemble
76. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
77. WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
78. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 1; WYo. CoNsr. art. 1, § 7.
79. Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia.
80. Delaware, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island.
81. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.
82. Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Tersey, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
83. E.g., Indiana-State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256
(1941); Louisiana-Bordon v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655
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and petition are invariably present with just four 4 and three exceptions,8 5
respectively. Almost every state Bill of Rights protects speech 8 as well
as press. However, a provision imposing responsibility for publications
is present in all but seven states."' West Virginia also provides that the
rights of free speech and press shall in no way limit the legislature's
power to restrain obscenity."
The Second 9 and Third Amendments"0 are also well represented
in the states, with many states further providing for no standing army"'
in peacetime and the subordination of the military to civil authorities.92
In some states the right to bear arms is specifically qualified to exempt
carrying concealed weapons9" or by allowing the legislature a free hand
in regulating the possession of weapons. 4
The Fourth Amendment search and seizure and warrant provisions
are present in some degree in every state, although in two states 8 the
language does not expressly prohibit unreasonable search and seizures;
and the language in some states is weaker than the federal provision.9
Two states have rejected the traditional formulations and have more
general provisions to the effect that: "No person shall be disturbed in
his private affairs or his home invaded without authority of law."9
New York has a provision which specifically protects telephone and
telegraph communications against unreasonable interceptions."9
(1909) ; Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Ed., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) ; Mississippi-
Chance v. Mississippi St. Textbook Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1940).
84. Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, Virginia.
85. Minnesota, New Mexico, Virginia.
86. All of the states except Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and North
Carolina protect speech.
87. Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Vermont,
West Virginia.
88. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
89. The following states have no provision comparable to that in the Second
Amendment guaranteeing the right to bear arms: California, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa,
Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
90. The following states have no provision comparable to that in the Third
Amendment restricting the power to quarter troops: Florida, Idaho, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New York, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin.
91. The following states prohibit a standing army in peacetime: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
92. Every state has a provision subordinating the military to the civil authorities
except New York.
93. E.g., Louisiana, North Carolina, Montana, New Mexico.
94. E.g., Oklahoma, Florida, Georgia, Idaho.
95. North Carolina, Virginia.
96. E.g., Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia.
97. Arizona, Washington.
98. N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 12.
139
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With the exception of the requirement of indictment by grand jury,
all of the Fifth Amendment rights are well represented, with some
exceptions in each one of these rights. Only twenty-five states provide in
their Bills of Rights for indictment by grand jury," and in nine00 of
those, the provision requires less than the federal in that it authorizes
the legislature to dispense with the requirement or limits the offenses to
which the requirement is applicable. Five states1"' have no express pro-
vision for double jeopardy, and two.. 2 do not mention self-incrimination.
Six.. omit reference to due process or "law of the land" and five10. have
no express requirement to make compensation for property taken.
Almost all Sixth Amendment rights are also present in most of the
states. Speedy and public trial is omitted in five states' and five. 6
more do not require both. Seven states" 7 do not provide for trial by
impartial jury with three0 8 omitting impartiality; seventeen.. 9 have no
requirement for trial in the district or county, while only three"0. do not
compel informing the accused of the charges, or giving him the right to
confront the witnesses. 1 or the right to compulsory process.1 ' Finally,
every state but one includes representation by counsel."'
All but two states"' expressly provide for trial by jury in common
law actions, as directed by the Seventh Amendment; but many states
have modified the unanimous verdict requirement. The Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibitions on excessive bail and fines, and cruel and unusual
punishment, are present except for two states"0 which omit reference to
99. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming.
100. Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Wyoming.
101. Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Vermont.
102. Iowa, New Jersey.
103. Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon.
104. Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina.
105. Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina.
106. Maryland, Mississippi, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.
107. California, Connecticut, Idaho, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota.
108. Massachusetts, North Carolina, West Virginia.
109. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas.
110. Idaho, Nevada, North Dakota.
111. Idaho, Nevada, North Dakota.
112. Nevada, New York, North Carolina.
113. Virginia.
114. Georgia, Kentucky.
115. Illinois, Vermont. Also, Illinois has no provision with respect to excessive
bail and fines.
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cruel and unusual punishment. Reservation of rights in the people as in
the Ninth Amendment is omitted in seventeen states.116 Only twenty
states1. have an "equal protection" provision, and in six".. of those it is
substantially weaker than the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
State Bills of Rights include a number of subjects not covered in the
Federal Bill of Rights. Some of these are merely matters covered elsewhere
in the Federal Constitution. Thus, all but seven11 states prohibit ex
post facto laws and all but twelve 2 ' prohibit impairment of the obligation
of contracts. Eighteen states... do not prohibit bills of attainder, while
twenty-two do not prohibit corruption of blood.'22 Only two states2 8
fail to place restrictions on suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
only nineteen' 2 expressly limit the power to suspend laws. Eleven
states125 provide for a power of revocation in the legislature to prevent
impairments of state sovereignty.
Several provisions which appear in state Bills of Rights but not the
federal are significant or at least potentially significant. In all but nine
states 26 persons are entitled to the right to bail except in capital cases.
Only ten states 27 fail to prohibit imprisonment for debt. Thirty-nine
states"' guarantee access to the courts and a legal remedy to all persons
116. Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
117. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington.
118. California, Indiana, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington.
119. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, New York, Ohio, Vermont.
120. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, NewYork, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont.
121. Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Wyoming.
122. California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming.
123. Maryland, Massachusetts.
124. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia.
125. Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota.
126. Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia.
127. Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Virginia, West Virginia.
128. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
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who have been injured or wronged. Thirty-six states... expressly provide
that truth shall be a defense to criminal libel, and some of these make the
defense equally applicable to civil actions. Six states' articulate a policy
of reformation in penal administration, although by and large these
provisions have had no observable impact on the penal laws of those states.
One state'.. specifically prohibits corporal punishment. Furthermore,
several states.3 2 specifically provide for a right of appeal and a few33
proscribe the unreasonable detention of witnesses.
There are provisions which guarantee the free exercise of suffrage,'
outlaw sex discrimination in juries... and provide for a right to public
education.' Several states2 7 protect the "right to work" and others.33
the right of workers to organize into unions. A few states3 . provide that
there shall be no property qualification for public office and some 40
guarantee property rights in resident aliens. Some states prohibit the
limitation of damages for death or injury. 4'
There are still other provisions, and the list could be longer; yet,
those enumerated represent a fair cross-section of state Bills of Rights
provisions. Of course, the enumeration of rights in a Bill of Rights does
not in and of itself compel that the right will be protected in accordance
with the plain meaning of the language; nor even that it will be protected
at all. Nevertheless, for judges and legislators who want to apply or
implement them, they are there to be so used.
ILLUSTRATIVE RIGHTS ON NATIONAL AND STATE LEVELS
In 1950, before the incorporation of most of the first eight amend-
ments into the Fourteenth, Paulsen pointed out an important yet neglected
source of materials on constitutional rights:
129. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
130. Alaska, Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Wyoming.
131. South Carolina (Georgia also prohibits whipping).
132. Arizona, Michigan, Nebraska, Utah.
133. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota,
South Carolina, Wyoming, Montana-
134. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington.
135. California, Hawaii, North Carolina, Washington.
136. North Carolina, Wyoming.
137. Florida, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming.
138. Missouri, New York.
139. Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah.
140. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota,
Wisconsin, Wyoming.
141. Arizona, New York, Ohio.
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State Court decisions and state constitutional materials are too
frequently ignored by both commentator and counsel when civil
liberties questions arise. State constitutions furnish extensive
and sometimes unique materials which can help in the pro-
tection of human liberties and state courts provide the forums
in which a very great number of civil liberties cases are decided.
And further:
State courts still may interpret their state constitutions to protect
civil liberties more widely than the Federal Constitution requires." 2
Subsequently, Mazor, 43 in one of the most provocative articles on
state Bills of Rights, while he points out with force that the most
significant factor about civil liberties and civil rights in the states is our
ignorance of the subject, nevertheless also alludes to utility and advantage
in state protection of rights above and beyond federal action.
Following the suggestions of these two authors, three areas of
individual rights will be briefly discussed here: 1) rights of criminal
defendants to counsel, along with some comments on search and seizure;
2) first amendment rights; and 3) equality and discrimination.
Right to Counsel
The subject of counsel in criminal cases has been well plowed in
legal literature. Usually those discussions point to the Sixth Amendment,
Johnson v. Zerbst," Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and now Gideon v. Wainwright.'45 Few think it significant to point to
Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution, or Webb v. Baird,4'
Myers v. State,1 ' Batchelor v. State,4 ' Speight v. State,4 ' Indiana Anno-
tated Statutes, section 2-2111.0 and 9-501(3)15 or similar authority in
142. Paulsen, supra note 12, at 620-21.
143. Mazor, supra note 12.
144. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Gellhorn states:
In 1938, in the case of Johnson v. Zerbst the Court concluded that a defendant
must either have the assistance of counsel or must understandably waive his
right to such assistance. This means that a defendant who cannot afford to pay
a fee may nevertheless insist that the Court appoint a lawyer to represent him.
*** Progress has been less clear in most of the state courts.
GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS 21-23 (1961). Cf. BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURT (1955).
145. 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
146. 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
147. 115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (1888).
148. 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920).
149. 239 Ind. 157, 155 N.E.2d 752 (1959).
150. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-211 provides:
Any poor person not having sufficient means to prosecute or defend an action
may apply to the Court in which the action is intended to be brought or is
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other states152 which not only parallel but precede the federal cases.
Mazor, distinguishing constitutional authority and precedent from
the mere salutory practice of appointing counsel, complains that:
It is difficult to locate a state court decision before Gideon
holding that provision of counsel to the indigent was con-
stitutionally required . .13
But Kamisar's statement is more to the point when he said on the
eve of Gideon:
To sum up, in only a handful of jurisdictions-and even then,
not in all parts of those states--does the Betts rule hold sway,
unmitigated by more liberal practice. When we take into account
not only the rules and laws "on the books" in thirty-nine states
(including the Maryland and New Hampshire provisions which
entitle indigents to counsel in many, although not all felony
cases) but also the almost invariable practice in five other states
(Delaware, Maine, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont)
the "judgment" of the states is overwhelming in favor of
extending the right to counsel for indigents beyond the narrow
circumstances covered by the Betts rule. 4
The real significance, though, is not that almost all states provided
counsel, at least at the trial stage, to indigent felony defendants prior to
Gideon, nor that this virtual unanimity provided strong support for the
Court's decision to bring the few laggard states into line. The real touch-
stone to the state's contribution to "the right to counsel" lies in the fact
that :
[W]hen in 1938 the Court held that the right of an accused
"to have the assistance of counsel for his defense" provided by
pending, for leave to prosecute or defend as a poor person. The Court, if
satisfied that such person has not sufficient means to prosecute or defend the
action, shall admit the applicant to prosecute or defend as a poor person, and
shall assign him an attorney to defend or prosecute the cause, and all other
officers requisite for the prosecution or defense, who shall do their duty therein
without taking any fee or reward therefor from such poor person.
151. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3501 (3) authorizes the appointment, compensation and
qualifications for public defenders.
152. E.g., cases cited in People v. Wdtenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358
(Ct. App. 1965) and AM. DIGEST, Criminal Law § 1500 at 2239 (century ed.), which
provides: "The criminal courts of record have the power to, and should, appoint
counsel for persons charged with crime who are too poor to provide counsel for
themselves."
153. Mazor, supra note 12, at 346. He does acknowledge that counsel was provided
to indigent defendants in most states long before Gideon.
154. Kamisar, supra note 38, at 20.
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the Sixth Amendment included the right of indigents to be
furnished counsel, thirty states already afforded counsel as of
right to all indigent felony defendants."'
It was the states' approach to the accuseds' rights which supplied the
strongest support for the Supreme Court's rationale in Patton v. United
States, which in turn, provided the major authority for the decision in
Johnson v. Zerbst."6
Justice Black dissenting in Betts v. Brady.5 7 and Justice Douglas
dissenting in McNeal v. Culver 58 relied heavily on the prevailing state
law requiring appointment of counsel in state prosecutions. Neither Justice
seemed particularly concerned that in most jurisdictions the right was
secured by statute, judicial decision or practice. The fact that these
statutes and many of the cases, particularly the earlier ones, do not make
a fetish of the "constitutional" label in no way detracts from the clear
implication that the opportunity to be represented by counsel was con-
sidered a basic ingredient of a fair trial.
The Indiana Supreme Court in 1854 briefly described its thoughts
on counsel:
It is not to be thought of, in a civilized community for a moment
that any citizen put in jeopardy of life or liberty, should be de-
barred of counsel because he was too poor to employ such aid.
No court could be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear
such a trial. The defense of the poor, in such cases, is a duty
resting somewhere, which will be conceded as essential to the
accused, to the court, and to the public." 9
Sixty-five years later that court, citing Article 1, section 13 of the
Indiana Constitution, set aside a conviction because:
The judge of the court told him that he had a right to have a
lawyer, but he did not ask him if he desired to have one. The
court did not inquire as to what means appellant possessed by
which he could employ a lawyer, and did not inform him that
it was the duty of the court to appoint a lawyer to appear for
him in case he possessed no means to employ one."'
155. Id. at 16.
156. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
157. 316 U.S. 455, 477-80 (1942) ; see also Beaney, supra note 144, at 80-99.
158. 365 U.S. 109, 119-22 (1961).
159. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
160. Batchelor v. State 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773, 776 (1920). While this was a
capital case, the right has not been so restricted. Hoy v. State, 225 Ind. 428, 75 N.E.2d
915 (1947) (robbery); Petro v. State, 204 Ind. 401, 184 N.E. 710 (1931) (rape);
Myers v. State, 115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (1888). Note, Right to Counsel in Indiana,
26 IND. L.J. 235-48 (1950).
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In an 1885 opinion, by Judge Vann in New York, the right to
counsel was described as follows:
While the territory now embraced by the State of New York
was a colony of Great Britian it was part of the common law
that counsel should be assigned by the court for the defense of
poor persons charged with crime (4 Black Com. 355; 1 Chitty
Cr. Law 407, 413). Upon the organization of our State, the
common law, with certain exceptions not material to be now
considered, was, by the Constitution then adopted, made a part
of the law of the land (Cons. State of N.Y., art. 1, sec. 7).1"1
One of the most interesting aspects of the states' role in the counsel
area stems from an incident in the Gideon case. Anthony Lewis, in
Gideon's Trumpet, describes how in response to a request submitted
by the Florida Attorney General asking the states to support his position
that Betts v. Brady should be affirmed, twenty-three states not only
rejected the offer, but in a separate amicus brief asked the Court to
overrule the case." 2 Only two states supported the Florida position.8
Two other states took no position on the request, for while they agreed
that the Supreme Court was invading the area of state criminal procedure,
these states had for some substantial period of time provided counsel for
indigents.'
The record of the states is more equivocal on other aspects of the
counsel problem. For example, the crush of states providing for the
appointment of counsel in felony cases is not nearly so overwhelming in
misdemeanor cases; although in some states the right of indigent mis-
demeanant defendants has been established.'65 In People v. Witenski, a
decision holding that indigent misdemeanants are entitled not only to
appointed counsel, but the right to be told that counsel will be appointed,
the New York Court of Appeals went through an unusually detailed
history to make the point that this decision reflected New York's long
standing policy on providing counsel.
161. People ex rel. Brown v. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 1,
(Sup. Ct. 1885).
162. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 38-160 (1966).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 145.
165. E.g., Speight v. State, 239 Ind. 157, 155 N.E.2d 752 (1959) ; Bolkovac v. State,
229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E.2d 250 (1951); People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d
358 (Ct. App. 1965); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE; TASK FORCE REPORT, THE COURTS 53 n.113 (1967); ABA
REPORT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES
38 (tent. draft 1967).
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In our discussions of New York statutes and of modern con-
stitutional constructions by the United States Supreme Court
we must not forget that in our State the right to counsel was
announced and insisted upon in much older case law. 8 '
After citing and discussing several of these "ancients," the court
concludes that "the later-enacted statutes are mere codifications of the
common law and constitutional principles . ,*."' The court concludes
that there were no indications (in fact the contrary seems to be true)
that this fundamental policy on counsel was intended to be limited to
major crimes or prosecution by indictment.
The court of appeals was most unjustly rewarded for its painstaking
history and detail when its efforts were subsequently described as: "The
Court, citing Gideon, ruled that defendants should have been informed,
etc.)1 68
In regard to right to counsel, pre and post trial and in probation
revocation or parole hearings, the record of the states is indeed spotty
and unimpressive. 6 ' Although New York courts had developed right to
counsel prior to trial up to one step short"" of Miranda v. Arizona,""
other states, even when they recognized a right to counsel upon arrest,
had not made the same progress.172 Nevertheless, the states are still
moving to a more amplified right of counsel. For example, Indiana in
1967 statutorily granted the right to counsel in probation revocation
proceedings,' and in 1968 New York, by judicial decision, granted the
right in parole revocation proceedings.7 This spotty record, however,
does not compare unfavorably with the state of the law in federal courts.7 5
The application of the exlusionary rule to unreasonable search and
seizure represents a contrasting history to the problem of counsel. For all
practical purposes, Weeks v. United States' was the first decision of
166. People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394, 207 N.E.2d 358, 367 (Ct. App. 1965).
167. Id.
168. 7 N.Y. TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 166 (1967).
169. Symposium-Right to Counsel, 45 MINN. L. REv. 693-896 (1961); Beaney,
supra note 144; ABA PROJECTs, supra note 165; Note, Right to Counsel in Indiana,
supra note 160; Note, Indigent's Right to Counsel on Appeal, 11 W. REs. L. REV. 649
(1960).
170. Compare, People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387, 207 N.E.2d 356 (1965) (and
cases cited therein) with People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852 (1965).
171. 384 U.S. <36 (1966).
172. Compare, Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949) with Marshall v.
State, 227 Ind. 1, 83 N.E.2d 763 (1948).
173. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-211 (Supp. 1968).
174. People ex rel. Coombs v. La Vallee, 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 186 N.Y.S.2d 600
(4th Dept. 1968).
175. Symposium--Right to Counsel, supra note 169.
176. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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substantial authority in a common law country to apply the exclusionary
rule to evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. Prior
to Weeks, the leading English case, Entick v. Carrington,7 ' provided
only a collateral remedy. There was no real federal precedent for Weeks
because two federal cases upon which Weeks relied, while they did
exclude evidence, were based primarily on considerations of self-incrimina-
tion."'
To say that no state had adopted the exclusionary rule prior to
Weeks does not in any way derogate from the states' concern for in-
dividual rights, since, except for the self-incrimination cases, there were no
federal cases either. Weeks was a precedent shattering case; neither
federal nor state courts which had followed the common law approach
until then had anything else to rely on.
One might speculate on what reception Weeks would have had in
the states without a mighty assist from Prohibition and its enforcement
tactics by federal and state agents. Justice Frankfurter, in an appendix to
the majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado7 ' listed sixteen states as having
followed the holding in Weeks and thirty-one as having rejected it. In
those sixteen following Weeks virtually all of the cases accepting the
rule involved seizures of intoxicating liquors.' But that notwithstanding,
sixteen states willingly interpreted their state constitutions as requiring
the same result in Weeks without any federal compulsion to do so. A
reading of the leading cases in those states indicates much the same
approach to any other common law issue where one jurisdiction has
evolved a novel and persuasive approach to a universal problem.
The states which followed Weeks did so simply because they
believed that their state constitutional provisions on search and seizure
and the Fourth Amendment were substantially the same and had evolved
from the same common law history. Thus, these courts for the first time
were confronted with a choice of two competing lines of authority: the
traditional common law view which had been followed in many of the
states, and the new federal view.
Flum v. State, cited by Justice Frankfurter as the leading Indiana
case adopting Weeks, characterizes the federal rule as follows:
Although the rule . . . has been declared by courts and a text
writer to be revolutionary and against all rules of evidence
theretofore pertaining to the subject, the rule . . . has since
177. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
178. See cases cited note 28 supra.
179. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
180. Wyoming is not really an exception because a previous case which adopted
Weeks, State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342 (1920), was a Prohibition case.
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been followed by the United States courts and the majority
of the state courts. 8 1
Seventeen months before Flum, the Indiana Supreme Court followed
Weeks in a most unspectacular way. That court in Callender v. State,
without much elaboration and no history, simply stated:
If the property was secured by search and seizure under the
pretext of a search warrant, which was invalid for any reason,
then the property so seized could not be used as evidence against
the appellant and its admission over his objections was pre-
judicial error. 8'
Some states followed the federal rule out of reluctance to oppose
decisions "of a tribunal whose decisions are entitled to such consideration
as those of the Supreme Court of our land. '88 But most of the states went
into reasonably detailed discussions of the two competing rules. Some
followed the federal rule because it was new and seemed to be finding
acceptance in the states."' Others went further and explored the com-
peting policies behind the two rules. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
viewed the implications of the common law rule as
not good law, nor even good morals, and is a practice not
calculated to inspire that respect for courts and court procedure
which rightfully appertains to them. If the doctrine that the
end justifies the means can be defended in any case, as in ward
politics, shady business transactions, or summary punishments
inflicted by self-constituted guardians of the conduct and morals
of others, it certainly should not be extended to apply to courts
and agents of the courts, whose primary function is to enforce
impartially all the laws without condoning or encouraging the
violation of any.8 5
It viewed the federal rule as
not based alone on the Constitutional right of an accused to
be immune from being forced to testify against himself in a
criminal case. It rests in part on the principle that the courts
and their agencies shall not actively participate in procuring
evidence illegally, and by a rule of evidence make nugatory the
rights conferred by the Constitution. 88
181. 193 Ind. 585, 141 N.E. 353, 355 (1923).
182. 193 Ind. 91, 138 N.E. 817, 818 (1923).
183. State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619, 234 N.W. 610, 612 (1930).
184. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920).
185. Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P. 545, 547 (1923).
186. Id. at 550.
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A few of the states recognized that they were not bound by the federal
authorities but regarded those decisions as persuasive."' The Florida
Supreme Court, for example, stated that:
Whatever other state courts may do, the Supreme Court of
Florida will guard and protect the constitutional rights, privi-
leges and immunities of the people, as sacredly as the federal
courts."' 8
It is undeniably correct that the Supreme Court has been the leader
in the search and seizure area, in contrast with the history of right to
counsel. Still these pre-Mapp federal and state cases represent more of
a common law evolution than anything else. The records of some states
in certain areas of criminal defendants' rights are particularly good when
compared to the federal and should not be overlooked in evaluating the
states. In other words the thirty states that appointed counsel prior to
Johnson v. Zerbst and the sixteen who followed Weeks before Mapp
and Wolf ought to be regarded as positive and impressive state achieve-
ments in protecting the rights of criminal defendants.
First Amendment Rights
Even though Paulsen specifically cites the importance of state
decisions and state constitutional provisions, his analysis of state protec-
tion of First Amendment rights leads him to conclude that the efforts of
the states "is disappointing."1 9 State decisions, he points out, only
occasionally are concerned with speech, press, assembly and religion,
and even less frequently do they go beyond the requirements of the United
States Supreme Court.' Perhaps one of the most accurate observations
was made more than fifty years ago:
Indifference is, indeed, the dominating attitude toward guaran-
tees of individual right; there is much greater interest in cutting
them down where they are inconvenient obstacles in the enforc-
ment of popular policies . . . than in preserving them unimpaired.'
The one thing which can be clearly said about state decisions in the
First Amendment area is that, while they may tend to support the exercise
of the police power, there seems to have been unanimity cnly on the
issue of non-unanimity.
187. Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845 (1922) ; Gore v. State, 24 Okla.
Crim. 394 218 P. 545 (1923) ; State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924).
188. Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329, 332 (1922).
189. Paulsen, supra note 12, at 642.
190. Id.
191. Freund, supra note 1, at 182.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1969], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss2/1
STATE "BILLS OF RIGHTS"
A survey of the state constitutions, a reasonably comprehensive
collection of state materials, reveals conflicts among the states on most
issues concerning religion.'92 On the question of busing parochial students
at public expense, for example, the authors find that "the state courts are
divided as to the constitutionality of such practice under their state
constitutions."' 93 The issue of public supplying of textbooks is similarly
unresolved; tuition grants to parochial schools seem tabu, but not where
these are part of veterans' benefits; direct grants seem unconstitutional;
released time constitutional; shared time unconstitutional in some states
though not in others. 9 ' And so the cases continue going off in many
different directions. The same might be said of the speech and assembly
cases in the states.
One difficulty in reviewing the state cases is that often they have no
constitutional label. For example, in 1940 the Supreme Court of Louis-
iana exempted Jehovah Witnesses selling the "Watchtower" from a state
statute which required every "peddler" and "hawker" to pay license
fees. Without fanfare or constitutional discussion that court simply stated
that:
In view of the nature of these transactions we are of the opinion
that the legislature did not intend to require those engaged in
disseminating the doctrines and principles of any religious sect,
either by the distribution, or sale, of books or pamphlets per-
taining to such, to pay a peddler's license, or to classify them
as peddlers. 9
In Matter of Frazee, decided in 1886, the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan invalidated a Grand Rapids parade permit requirement because a per-
mit could be granted or not at the "uncontrolled and arbitrary will" of the
Common Council or Mayor. 6 Like Cantwell v. Connecticut,' subse-
quently decided by the United States Supreme Court, the Michigan court
held that standards for determining the grant or denial of an application
must be provided. In language more contemporary than 19th century
the Court said:
These processions for political, religious, and social demonstra-
tions are resorted to for the express purpose of keeping up
192. ANTINEAU, CARROLL & BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
(1965).
193. Id. at 32.
194. Id. at 24, 29-31, 40-41, 42-45, 47-50.
195. State ex rel. Semansky v. Stark, 196 La. 307, 199 So. 129 (1940).
196. 63 Mich. 396, 403, 30 N.W. 72, 74 (1886).
197. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and frequently to produce some
effect on the public mind by the spectacle of unions and numbers.'
Yet, like many of the older cases, no reference to a constitution,
state or federal, is made, nor is there any development of a theory of
constitutional right, at least not in the contemporary sense.
More recent state cases (post-incorporation), however, discuss the
issues in constitutional terms. But, except where there are explicit and
novel provisions in their own state constitutions, they seem to prefer
to rely on the United States Constitution and Supreme Court decisions.
Thus in Commonwealth v. Akmakjian, a case which Judge Magruder
declined to resolve in the federal court, reserving it instead to the state
courts,'9 9 the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down a municipal
ordinance which inhibited Jehovah Witensses from selling the "Watch-
tower."" '° The state court decision was based on a previous Massachusetts
case,20 1 which in turn relied almost exclusively on United States Supreme
Court cases, even though there were adequate state precedents available.
In a more surprising approach, the California Supreme Court, in exempt-
ing from criminal prosecution Indians using peyote in ceremonial rights,
relied exclusively on the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and relied almost exclusively on United States Supreme Court
precedents. 2 It is true that statutes in New Mexico and Montana and a
judicial decision in Arizona reached the same result, but these were
mentioned only in passing. The California court was not troubled by the
Supreme Court's decisions on polygamy,' Sunday closing,"0 4 vaccina-
tion,0 5 child labor,' etc.
From a strict result-oriented view there should be no difference
whether the state construes its own constitutional provision alone, or
with the federal, or whether it relies solely on federal provisions and
precedent. However, even from the result-oriented view there are occasion-
al disadvantages. In nine cases, decided between Everson and 1964,
adjudicating the constitutionality of busing, six of the seven states which
198. 63 Mich. 396, 404, 30 N.W. 72, 75 (1886).
199. Hannah v. City of Heverhill, 120 F.2d 87, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 641 (1941);
discussed in FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 237 (1968).
200. 316 Mass. 97, 55 N.E.2d 6 (1944).
201. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1963).
202. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. App. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
203. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). But see Justice Murphy's
dissenting opinion in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 25 (1946), which indicates
that the Court's view of "free exercise" is in some respects unduly limited.
204. Braunfield v. Braun, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Justices Brennan and Stewart,
in dissenting opinions, point out the limited view which the Court has of "free
exercises." Id. at 611 and 616 respectively.
205. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904).
206. Prince v. Massachusetts, 371 U.S. 158 (1943).
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ruled against busing had strong state constitutional provisions barring
state money for sectarian use."0 The seventh state had a weaker provision
yet one which was still stronger and clearer against such financial
assistance than the two states which held that busing was not unconsti-
tutional."'8 Recently, however, the New York Court of Appeals, with
admittedly more restrictive state constitutional provisions than are
contained in the First Amendment, reversed its previous rejection of the
"child benefit" theory and "amended" the New York Constitution to
bring it into line with the Federal Constitution and Supreme Court
authorities.0 ' This decision might reveal the beginning of a reversal of
a trend in which stricter state constitional provisions and cases will be
abandoned in favor of more permissive federal precedents. 10
One of the advantages of citing both the state and federal con-
stitutions is that it leaves state judges some room to maneuver if
subsequent Supreme Court decisions fall short of their predicted mark.
The Supreme Court dismissed a writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted in a case challenging the denial of the use of a public school
building to hold a meeting where the building had been so used by other
organizations in the past. 1' The writ was dismissed because "petitioner
has failed to allege in his pleading .. . that other organizations of a
similar character . ..have been allowed to use the Yonkers schools. 21 2
Compare that decision with Justice Traynor's majority opinion in Dan-
skin v. San Diego Unified School District, in which a similar complaint
resulted in striking down a section of a California law which excluded
groups advocating the overthrow of the United States by force and
207. Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963) (no public money for
church); Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962) (no money
for religious societies) ; Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961) (no
money for sectarian schools) ; McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953)
(money only for free schools) ; Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951)
(no school funds for sectarian schools) ; Visser v. Noosack Valley School Dist., 33
Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949) (no money shall be appropriated for religious
instruction). See also La Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited, 13 J. PUB. LAW
76, 81-87 (1964).
208. Silver Lake School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984, 29 N.W.2d 214 (1947)
(case held no compulsion to pay taxes for place of worship. This case, while striking
down the provision for busing, did so on non-constitutional grounds). Two cases with the
weakest provisions upheld busing. Snyder v. Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161
A.2d 770 (1961) (no person required to support any church); Squires v. City of
Augusta, 151 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959) (no preference of one sect over another).
209. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791 (1967); see notes
41-49 supra and accompanying text.
210. E.g., in 1967, Wisconsin, whose courts strictly construed the state's more
restrictive provisions [see Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761
(1962)] amended its constitution to specifically allow busing. Wisc. CONsT. art.
1, § 3.
211. Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458 (1955).
212. Id. at 460.
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violence.21 The state decision, however, was based exclusively on First
and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees and preceded the above Supreme
Court decision. While the subsequent Supreme Court decision is not,
strictly speaking, inconsistent with Danskin, it does represent a different
attitude toward the problem and would be expected to inhibit, rather
than further, individual rights. Reliance by a state court on its own
constitution permits it to go further than the Supreme Court, should it
desire, without any embarrassment.
Equality-Discrimination
Writing in 1952, Gussman sets the stage for some brief comments
on the states' role in achieving equality and outlawing discrimination.
He said:
The enforcement by federal legislation of constitutional rights of
individuals is a story written largely in terms of confusion,
distortion and frustration. Seldom, if ever, have the power and
purposes of legislation been rendered so impotent. Indeed, this
story constitutes one of the saddest chapters in the historic
struggle to effectuate the American ideal of freedom and
equality for all. 1'
It is in this context then that the Supreme Court's decisions such as
Brown v. Board of Education.. become provocative and understandably
important. It explains too, in part, why, at least until recent years, there
have been few federal laws against discrimination or encouraging equality.
One must remember also, that it was not until Bolling v. Sharpe,"'
decided at the same time as Brown, that segregated schools in the
District of Columbia were invalidated. Further, it was the United States
Supreme Court which earlier had invalidated on commerce grounds a
Louisiana reconstruction statute outlawing discrimination on public con-
veyances.21 And, regardless of its origination, it was the Court which
immortalized into devastating precedent the "separate but equal doc-
trine."21
In contrast with Congress, the states have relied almost exclusively
on statutes or administrative action in combatting discrimination. Cor-
213. 28 Cal. App. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946). See also A.C.L.U. v. Bd. of Ed. of
Los Angeles, 55 Cal. App. 2d 167, 359 P.2d 45, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 819 (1961).
214. Gussman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. Rzv.
1323 (1951).
215. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
216. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
217. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
218. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1969], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss2/1
STATE "BILLS OF RIGHTS"
respondingly, there has been comparatively little litigation on the subject
in the states. Some states had responded more quickly through legislation
than the Court. For example, Roberts v. City of Boston21 has the dubious
credit of being one of the first and oft-cited enunciations of the "separate
but equal doctrine." However six years after that case was decided,
Senator Charles Sumner, who unsuccessfully represented the plaintiff,
succeeded in getting a statute passed which prohibited public school
segregation in Massachusetts.22 °
On the eve of Brown v. Board of Education, while Congress and
the Court adhered to "separate but equal" schools, twenty-nine states had
rejected that approach, seventeen by statute or case law and twelve by
prior abolition or practice.2 ' While this still left twenty-two juris-
dictions which required or permitted it, twenty-nine states had a record
better than the national government. 2
In many states there is a substantial amount of legislation designed
to prevent discrimination, sometimes setting up administrative agencies to
implement the states' policies. As a matter of fact, the chief device in
states on the equality issue seems to be legislation rather than case law.
A study completed in 1952 found "more than 200 state laws and con-
stutional provisions .. .which prohibit discrimination of various types
on the basis of race, religion, color or national origin."2 In view of the
almost unlimited scope of legislative power which states have, compared
with the delegated powers of Congress, it is understandable why there
has been resort to the legislative device. A statute can be comprehensive
in scope while judicial decisions, particularly in the equality area, tend
to split hairs.224 Statutes may deter violations,"' especially if there are
219. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
220. Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools, 67 HARV. L. REv. 377,
383-84 (1953).
221. Id. at 378-79.
222. Id.
223. BERGER, EQUALITY ]BY STATUTE 108 (1952). See also MURRAY, STATES'
LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950) (contains the texts of state Constitutions, statutes
and ordinances on discrimination).
224. E.g., McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 5, 8-11
(1945). The author describes early cases in California and Michigan which held that
racial restrictive covenants against sale or lease were invalid, but as to use or occupancy
were valid. See also Annot. 3 A.L.R.2d 466, 489-92 (1949).
225. This assertion, like any statement on the deterrent effect of law, is difficult
to establish. However the following statements by Berger support it:
Law is an effective means for reducing discrimination or overt antiminority
conduct of the extremely prejudiced. We have seen that the personality studies
have found such persons to be conformists of a certain kind, respective of
power, scorning the weak but toadying to the strong. One of the few constants
in their behavior is submission to the symbols of power. Law, when it is
backed by the full panoply of the state has strong support in at least some
sections of the community, is just such a symbol. Even if law did nothing but
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substantial penalties attached and evidence of a willingness to enforce
them. On the other hand, statutes too may be productive of hair-splitting
litigation.226 But the most serious criticism of statutes is that they may sit
on the books unimplemented and unenforced. The equality area, perhaps
more than any other, is subject to this criticism. Thirty years ago an
article on legislative attempts to eliminate discrimination summarized the
experience to that date:
The enforcement of civil rights laws leaves much to be desired.
Few members of racial and religious minorities know of the
existence of civil rights laws and most of those who do are
unwilling to undergo the humility of pressing their claims,
especially in hostile communities. Moreover, discrimination
is not easy to prove. . . . This whole situation is aggravated
by the attitude of some courts limiting the application of the acts
on dubious grounds. Consequently, civil rights acts are widely
disregarded. 27
Still, even with these limitations, legislative efforts continue apace.
An article published early in 1966 stated that more state anti-discrimina-
tion laws were passed by the states in 1964 and 1965 than in any other
biennium:
31 states enacted 67 new laws pertaining to discriminating
practices affecting employment, education, housing, public ac-
commodations and other areas, as compared with the previous
record of 26 states adopting 49 new laws in the years 1962-63.28
In the same article, a summary of existing state laws revealed that
twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia had fair employment laws
"enforceable by administrative procedures"; seven states had laws express-
ly prohibiting discrimination in education; seventeen states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia "prohibited discrimination in a substantial portion of the
reduce discrimination by such persons, it would be accomplishing something
of value in a multi-group democracy. But there is evidence that anti-bias laws
can also influence the conditions under which our attitudes are developed
and maintained. * * *
While there are many laws that have little or no observable effect, a law
that is incorporated into a vast regulative network tends to be obeyed.
BERGER, supra note 223, at 185, 187.
226. Note, Legislative Attempts to Eliminate Racial and Religious Discrimination,
39 COLUm. L. REv. 986, 998-99 n.73 (1939); Colley & McGhee, The California and
Washington Fair Housing Cases, 2 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 79 (1962).
227. Note, Legislative Attempts to Eliminate Racial and Religious Discrimination,
supra note 226, at 1002.
228. Robison & Flicker, Summary of 1964 and 1965 State Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 3 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 95 (1966).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1969], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss2/1
STATE "BILLS OF RIGHTS"
general housing market"; and thirty-five states and the District of
Columbia prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodation. 29
The wealth of legislation in the states has continued to date. The
legislatures' section of the final issue of the Race Relations Law Reporter
reveals a continuation of the trend to create state or local civil rights
agencies in states and cities which had none,2"' and to extend the powers
of such agencies where they have existed for some time.231 Furthermore,
some states and cities are now grappling with problems which they had
avoided in the past, such as housing 2. and educational materials fairly
and accurately depicting Negroes." State and local agencies charged
with administering anti-discrimination legislation have continued enforce-
ment of these measures. 2 4
The scope of these state statutes can be illustrated by regarding New
York as an example, although it should be pointed out that New York
is not typical since it has been a leader in this area. New York adopted
its present constitutional equality-nondiscrimination provision in 1938.2"'
Since then the Legislature has adopted a variety of measures designed
to combat discrimination. The Report of the Temporary State Com-
mission on the Constitutional Convention lists these measures as follows:
Thus the Legislature has prohibited discrimination on account
of race, creed, color or national origin:
-In the enjoyment of civil rights.
-In places of public accommodation resort, or amusement.
-In employment both private and public.
,;-In housing accommodations (except in one or two family
houses where the owner resides).
-In public housing.
-In publicly assisted housing accommodations.
-In private housing financing.
-In the sale, rental or lease of commercial space.
229. Id. at 96-99.
230. 12 RACE REL. L. REP. (Winter 1967) cites the establishment of "Rights
Commissions" in New Orleans, La. (Id. at 2203), Austin, Tex. (Id. at 2205) and St.
Paul, Minn. (Id. at 2213). In 1964 Gov. Romney of Michigan described the Civil Right
Commission of the State under its new Constitution:
A bi-partisan civil rights commission, unique to any one state constitution, is
established as the machinery by which the protection of laws relating to
individual rights may be gained.
37 STATE GOVT. 2, 4 (1964).
231. 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 2196-2203, 2207 (Pa. and Conn. respectively).
232. Id. at 2219 (Elgin, Ill.), 2222 (Topeka, Kan.), 2225 (Louisville, Ky.).
233. Id. at 2208 (N.J.).
234. Id. at 2275-94. See also BERGER, supra note 223, at 109-69.
235. 10 N.Y. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS 55 (1967).
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-In the admission of applicants to educational institutions.
-In its use of facilities of educational corporations or associa-
tions which are open to the public, non-sectarian and exempt
from taxation.
-In its selection of juries.
-In its examination or admission to practice of attorneys.
-In the price charged for admission to facilities open to the
public.
-In the sale or delivery, of alcholic beverages.
-In the use of accommodations furnished by cemetery associa-
tions.
-By labor organizations, employers, employment agencies or
joint labor-management committees controlling apprentice train-
ing programs.
-By industries involved in defense contracts.
-By public utilities.
-By contractors, subcontractors or agents or employees en-
gaged in contracts of public works.
-By insurance companies.
-By real estate brokers, salesmen or agents or employees
thereof, in the rental, sale, etc. of housing accommodations,
land or commercial space.
The Legislature has also prohibited:
-Inquiries concerning the religion of persons seeking employ-
ment in the public schools.
-The wrongful refusal of admission to, or eviction from
places of public entertainment and amusement.
-Discriminatory deprivation of employment provided by
government funds for relief purposes." 6
However, an overview of the problem reveals, just as in the previous
areas of defendants' rights and First Amendment rights, that the record
of the states is spotty and inconsistent. Some states preceded federal
activity in particular areas as to both recognition of rights and their
enforcement. Other states which have credible records on recognition
of rights are lacking in enforcement. And finally some states have
virtually no recognition or enforcement records.
If the states must be evaluated as a whole, the record is unimpressive.
On the other hand, if the efforts of some states 7 in prohibiting segregated
236. Id. at 57-58.
237. Leflar & Davis, supra note 220.
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schools before Brown v. Board of Education, of prohibiting enforcement
of restrictive covenants. 8 before Shelly v. Kramer,"' as stepping in to
fill the gap in public accommodations when the first Civil Rights Act
was declared unconstitutional,24 in prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment or housing, and of establishing and financing administrative
agencies to enforce non-discrimination laws,24' are evaluated on their own
merits, then the achievements of the states are more substantial and
impressive.
RECENT STATE ACTIVITY2 4 2
Review of recently adopted and recently proposed state constitutions
shows that at least some changes have been suggested in Bills of Rights
provisions. By and large these proposed "Rights" are collections of
something old, something new and something borrowed. Most recent
constitutions and constitutional studies retain much of the substance,
and even language, of provisions which typify almost all existing Bills of
Rights. While there are some obvious efforts at streamlining, provisions
on quartering of soldiers and treason against the state still appear. Terms
such as "ex post facto," "excessive bail" and "equal protection," which are
really shorthand descriptions of formal legal concepts, are also retained.24
There is some borrowing from other constitutions. Typically Four-
teenth Amendment "due process" and "equal protection" language is
lifted.2"
238. See note 224 supra and accompanying text. Some of the states had invalidated
restrictions over ownership.
239. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
240. Legislative Attempts to Eliminate Racial and Religious Discrimination, supra
note 226, at 997.
241. See note 234 supra and accompanying text
242. The states which have recently undergone constitutional revision studies have
published materials which are extremely valuable as research tools. Often these contain
materials which deal almost exclusively with the state concerned; e.g., Arkansas
Constitutional Revision Study Committee, Revising the Arkansas Constitution (1968);
Maryland Constitutional Convention Commission, Report of the Constitutional Conven-
tion Commission (1967). Sometimes comparative materials are included in some
degree; e.g., see the series of materials published by the N.Y. Temporary State
Commission on Constitutional Convention (1967), and those published by the Michigan
Constitutional Conventional Commission under the title of Michigan Constitutional
Convention Studies (1961). However, the most recent publication, Legal Reference
Bureau, Hawaii Constitutional Convention Studies; Article i, Bill of Rights (1968), is
one of the best, both in content and organization, and was relied on substantially in
this part of the paper.
Other materials include, Rankin, The Bill of Rights, included as ch. IX of Graves,
State Constitutional Revisions (1960) and Ranin, State Constitution's Bill of Rights
(1960) published by the National Municipal League. See also 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. (March
1968).
243. E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, §§ 10, 20; MIcH. CONST. art. 1, §§ 8, 20.
244. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 3; HAWAII CONST. art. 1, § 4; MICH. CONST. art.
1, § 2.
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In the realm of "new" provisions, contemporary problems as in the
first Bills of Rights dominate the proposals. The two most prominent
involve wiretapping and discrimination. The Federal Bill of Rights, while
it may have provided excellent protection of privacy in the nineteenth
century seems woefully deficient, without a great deal of stretching, to
cope with the technological advances and attitudinal changes of the
twentieth century. Thus, in both the ill-fated New York and Maryland
proposed constitutions which were defeated, Fourth Amendment-like
protection was afforded to oral communications. 4 Neither state would
have abolished the practices, but instead subjected them to judicial con-
trol. Yet these efforts do not by any means exhaust the subject. The
collection of data in memory banks and the sex revolution pose unlimited
problems in privacy. To what extent may the state prescribe, proscribe
and police sexual activity between consenting adults? Griswold v. Con-
necticut,"6 while it raises the problem, offers no sure-fire solution. As a
matter of fact, it is precisely the Griswold case which emphasizes the
problem. Almost all of the Justices had a different rationale to support
their point of view. Is this privacy a "penumbra" of other rights; is it,
at long last, a justification for the Ninth Amendment, or does it have
a constitutional basis at all? Justice Black, who has persistently articulated
his incorporation theory, could not fit the facts into any one or more of
the existing Bill of Rights provisions.
It is in problems like privacy that state provisions and state judges
might provide reasonable approaches. This then raises for the state a
question of technique. Should state constitutions include general protec-
tion for the privacy concept, or is it preferable to take specific and
important problems like wiretapping and provide for them separately?
Without advancing any suggestion, it is in just this kind of situation
that states can be most useful. It is quite appalling to some people to
think of the states as laboratories.4 in the area of individual rights. Yet
general protections of privacy may be so broad as to be relegated to the
''nice-sentiment" class of constitutional provisions and serve no real
utility. On the other hand, specific provisions for specific problems might
make for an intolerably long Bill of Rights which would undoubtedly still
have significant gaps. Two states now have provisions which, instead of
following the traditional search and seizure language, are much broader
245. MD. PROPOSED CONST. art. 1, § 105; N.Y. PROPOSED CONST. art. 1, § 4(b);
New York has this provision in its present Constitution, art. 1, § 12.
246. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
247. Paulsen, supra note 12, at 642.
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privacy measures.2 4 It will be interesting to compare the applications
of such provisions with the ad hoc type of protection.
Discrimination is the second area reflecting new or at least newer
proposals. The impact of discrimination-related problems is most apparent
on the local and state levels. De facto segregation, decentralization of
school control and segregated housing patterns are all pressing hard on
the states and cities today. This then raises the question of whether state
constitutions, when they attempt to handle the problem, ought to be
only negative in effect. Is it sufficient to prohibit discrimination? Is
there some state responsibility for attacking not only discrimination but
the effects of discrimination? If so, should there be anything in state
constitutions to reflect this responsibility and goal? Should "equality"
provisions in state constitutions be self-executing? These are but a few of
the questions which are raised with respect to possible state constitutional
provisions on equality.2 4
The recent state constitutions are unspectacular and rather uninspir-
ing in this regard. Most new drafts have recommended that the equal
protection language of the Fourteenth Amendment be adopted. Some
like Alaska 2.1 and, more so Michigan,252 have embellished upon that
language in providing for no discrimination based on race, religion,
color or national origin. The New York proposal was more comprehen-
sive and went further than the others. Article I, section 3a of the pro-
posed constitution provided:
248. ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8: "No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." See also WASH. CONST. art. 1,
§ 7 (identical provision). Compare this broadly stated protection with efforts to cope
with particular problems such as wiretapping. See note 245 supra and accompanying text.
249. There are two points of view on whether a Bill of Rights should specifically
include statements of "ideals." The first Bills of Rights obviously thought this proper;
however, more recent trends appear to the contrary. RANKIN, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
160-61 (included in Graves, supra note 242). See also note 225 supra and accompanying
text.
250. E.g., MD. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION 103-04 (1967).
251. No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right
because of race, color, creed, or national origin. The legislature shall implement
this section.
ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 3.
• * . nor be denied the enjoyment of his civil rights or be discriminated against
in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.
HAWAII CONST. art. 1, § 4.
252. No person shall be denied equal protection of the laws; nor shall
any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be
discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color
or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate
legislation.
MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 2. See also id. at art 5, §29.
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[N]o person shall because of race, color, creed, religion,
national origin, age, sex or physical or mental handicap, be
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by the states
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, or by any
person, corporation, or unincorporated association public or
private. The legislature shall provide that no public money
shall be given or loaned to or invested with any person or entity,
public or private, violating this section.
The Puerto Rican Constitution, in Article 2, section 20, enumerates
certain human rights including education, the right to work, the right of
an adequate standard of living, etc. This represents somewhat of a
departure from precedent and it will be interesting to see if these
provisions, more closely resembling language in European constitutions,
will provide any significant support toward achieving the enumerated
goals or whether the provision will be one of "nice sentiments" only.
The final area is the constantly recurring problem of state support
for activities under sectarian sponsorship. Most of the state constitutional
provisions which specifically deal with the problem are absolute in that
either all assistance is prohibited or certain types of assistance is authoriz-
ed. Again without invading the substantive merits of the issue, it seems
that the issues might be more rationally discussed if proposals to permit
assistance contained specifically enumerated policy guidelines. For exam-
ple, assistance to parochial schools should not be at the expense of the
public school system; parochial school support should not be a means
which in either design or effect will promote racial segregation; the kinds
of activity supported must be ones which the state is authorized to carry
out itself, etc. Perhaps these suggestions are illusory in terms of the
battle lines which have been drawn; or the suggested guidelines may be
overly susceptible to abuse. It would seem, though, that if legislation is
going to authorize assistance, a constitutional provision with guidelines
would provide a better frame of reference.
CONCLUSIONS
1) A basic question we are facing is not how to resolve the
overall problems of federalism, but whether a pluralistic, rather than a
monolithic, approach to safeguarding individual rights is desirable. If a
shared responsibility is indicated, the breakdown for sharing will be
between national and local entities. If the megalopolis is to replace the
state as the significant and powerful local govermental entity, and it is
not here suggested that it should or would, then perhaps some attention
ought to be given to how cities rather than states can protect rights.
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Perhaps some organic document which represents the real beginning of
the super-city ought to contain its own declaration of individual rights.
While these declarations would have to be consistent with the federal and
state constitutions, they might permit attention to be given to the details
of individual rights in a peculiarly urban context. Continuing population
growth coupled with reapportionment may render such an idea useless,
for the cities may in fact become or control the states. Still it does
represent a possibility of keeping alive the concept of cooperative feder-
alism.2"'
2) Without reflecting on what would happen if the privilege
against self-incrimination were removed from the Fifth Amendment,2 '
or if the Supreme Court changed substantially both in personnel and
philosophy, there are still four practical advantages to a viable state
Bill of Rights. First, on some matters states can and will go further at
any given time in protecting individual rights than the Supreme Court.
Second, while state courts have many competing interests to reconcil
when considering problems involving conflicts between the state and
individuals, they do not have to feel restrained by the additional problem
of federalism. There have been repeated examples of restraint by the
national government where state interests are also involved. The Supreme
Court, for example, not only considers what it believes to be the best
legal approach to problems, but also the effect of its decisions on federal-
state relations. 5
A. third ground is the ability of the states to experiment. Examples
of such experimentation are not easy to find in the individual rights area.
Still, there are some examples.. and much potential, particularly in such
areas as privacy. Finally, the most important consideration involves the
implementation of rights. It is one thing for the Supreme Court to say
that a particular practice invades individual rights, but a completely
different matter for all of the local authorities involved in the practice
to correct or discontinue the activity. It seems there would be a better
chance of local public officials accepting or enforcing local laws and
253. MARTIN, supra note 5 at 35 ,37, 46.
254. See, e.g., H. Res. 1400, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968):
The fifth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
amended by inserting immediately after "nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself" the following: "except in open
court."
255. E.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947). Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
CALIF. L. REv. 929 (1965).
256. The area of privacy and the question of approaching it broadly or narrowly
has previously been referred to and is one of the best examples. See note 248 supra
and accompanying text. The various approaches to the non-establishment of religion is
another example. See notes 79-88 supra and accompanying text.
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decisions than those which emanate from Washington.
Curiously and sadly the worst indictment against some states on
certain issues is not that they are indifferent to individual rights, but
that they are hostile to them. There seems to be appearing today on some
state levels an attitude of-let the Supreme Court concentrate on pro-
tecting individuals and we will protect society. Somehow the American
Constitutional ideal that society is strengthened when due rights are
accorded to the lowest man in society is dormant or disappearing rapidly
on the state level. Of course, there are many reasons for this phenomenon
but at least part of the problem is this feeling of preemption. At least
some of the newer constitutions and proposed constitutions have not
evidenced thoughts of abdication because of "incorporation"; and while
changes have been modest they demonstrate that there are large gaps in
the federally protected rights which will have to be filled by the states.
APPENDIX
This Appendix contains the Bills of Rights provisions of the fifty
states and the Model State Constitution and uses the organization of
the Federal Bill of Rights. Some state provisions have been arbitrarily
excluded from the chart where they seem to involve exclusively local
considerations such as elaborate provisions on boundaries or particularly
detailed schemes of compensation for taking private property.
When a state has a relevant provision, it is so indicated by putting
the section number of the state provision in the appropriate place. An
asterisk (*) following a section number means that the state provision
in some respects is less comprehensive than the federal provision or the
general level of state protections, as the case may be. A double asterisk
(**) means that the state has adopted a modern statement to cover the
relevant rights. In some states the right to bear arms is subject to
qualification either in that it specifically does not apply to concealed
weapons or it gives the legislature the power to modify the right; this is
indicated on the chart by "(R)" following the section number. Many
states provide in their constitution for the legislative creation of exceptions
to the necessity for indictment by grand jury; this is indicated on the
chart by the word "information" immediately above the section number.
Following the chart there is a collection of miscellaneous state
provisions which are in force only in some states.
Some of the state provisions, particularly those dealing with religion
or due process, are very old and require some interpretation. The place-
ment of these provisions in various chart sections, therefore, may be
subject to question.
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STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS
AMEND. VI-In
all criminal prose-
cutions (Con't) AMEND. VII
Assistance Trial by Jury
of counsel common law
for defense actions
ALABAMA (Art. I) §6 §11
ALASKA (Art I) §11 §16
ARIZONA (Art. II) §24 §23
ARKANSAS (Art. II) §10 §7
CALIFORNIA (Art. I) §13 §7
COLORADO (Art. II) §16 §23
CONNECTICUT (Art. I) §8 §19
DELAWARE (Art. I) §7 §4
FLORIDA §11 §3
GEORGIA (Art. I) §2-105
HAWAII (Art. I) §11 §10
IDAHO (Art. I) §13 §7
ILLINOIS (Art. II) §9 §5
INDIANA (Art. I) §13 §20
IOWA (Art. I) §10 §9
KANSAS §10 §5
KENTUCKY §11 §7
LOUISIANA (Art. I) §9
MAINE (Art. I) §6 §20
MARYLAND Art. 21 Art. 5
MASSACHUSETTS (Sec. 2) Art. 12 Art. 15
MICHIGAN (Art. I) §20 §14
MINNESOTA (Art. I) §6 §4
MISSISSIPPI (Art. 3) §26 §31
MISSOURI (Art. I) §18A §22A
MONTANA (Art. III) §16 §23*
NEBRASKA (Art. I) §11 §6
NEVADA (Art. I) §8 §3
NEW HAMPSHIRE (Part First) Art. 15 Art. 20
NEW JERSEY (Art. I) §10 §9
NEW MEXICO (Art. II) §14 §12
NEW YORK (Art. I) §6 §2
NORTH CAROLINA (Art. I) §11 §19
NORTH DAKOTA (Art. I) §13 §7
OHIO (Art. I) §10 §5
OKLAHOMA (Art. II) §20 §19
OREGON (Art. I) §11 §17
PENNSYLVANIA (Art. I) §9 §6
RHODE ISLAND (Art. I) §10 §15
SOUTH CAROLINA (Art. I) §18 §25
SOUTH DAKOTA (Art. VI) §7 §6
TENNESSEE (Art. I) §9 §6
TEXAS (Art. I) §10 §15
UTAH (Art. I) §12 §10*
VERMONT (CI. I) Art. 10 Art. 12
VIRGINIA (Art. I) §11
WASHINGTON (Art. I) §22 §21
WEST VIRGINIA (Art. III) §14 §13
WISCONSIN (Art I) §7 §5
WYOMING (Art. I) §10 §9
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STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS
AMEND. VIII
(Continued) Additional State Penal Provisions
Penal
administration
to be based on
All persons reformation
No cruel and bailable ex- and need for
unusual cept for capi- protecting
punishment tal offenses public
ALABAMA (Art I) §15 §16
ALASKA (Art I) §12 §11 §12
ARIZONA (Art. II) §15 §22
ARKANSAS (Art. II) §9 §8
CALIFORNIA (Art. I) §6 §6
COLORADO (Art. II) §30 §19
CONNECTICUT (Art. I) §8
DELAWARE (Art. I) §11 §12
FLORIDA §8 §9
GEORGIA (Art. I) §2-109
HAWAII (Art. I) §9
IDAHO (Art. I) §6 §6
ILLINOIS (Art. II) §7
INDIANA (Art. I) §16 §17 §18
IOWA (Art. I) §17 §12
KANSAS §9 §9
KENTUCKY §17 §16
LOUISIANA (Art. I) §12 §12
MAINE (Art. I) §9 §10*
MARYLAND Arts. 25, 16
MASSACHUSETTS (Sec. 2) Art. 26
MICHIGAN (Art. I) §16 §15
MINNESOTA (Art. I) §5 §7
MISSISSIPPI (Art. 3) §28 §29
MISSOURI (Art. I) §21 §20
MONTANA (Art. III) §20 §19 §24
NEBRASKA (Art. I) §9 §9
NEVADA (Art. I) §6 §7
NEW HAMPSHIRE (Part First) Art. 33 Art. 18
NEW JERSEY (Art. I) §12 §11
NEW MEXICO (Art. II) §13 §13
NEW YORK (Art I) §5
NORTH CAROLINA (Art. I) §14
NORTH DAKOTA (Art. I) §6 §6
OHIO (Art. I) §9 §9
OKLAHOMA (Art. II) §9 §8
OREGON (Art. I) §16 §14 §15
PENNSYLVANIA (Art. I) §13 §14
RHODE ISLAND (Art. I) §8 §9
SOUTH CAROLINA (Art. I) §19 §20
SOUTH DAKOTA (Art. VI) §23 §8
TENNESSEE (Art. I) §16 §15
TEXAS (Art. I) §13 §11
UTAH (Art. I) §9 §8
VERMONT (Ch. I) Pt. 2, Art. 32
VIRGINIA (Art. I) §9
WASHINGTON (Art. I) §14 §20
WEST VIRGINIA (Art. III) §5
WISCONSIN (Art- I) §6 §8
WYOMING (Art. I) §14 §14 §15
MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION §1.06(b) §1.06(b)
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1969], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss2/1
STATE "BILLS OF RIGHTS"
STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS
Additional State
AMEND. IX AMEND. XIV Provisions
Enumeration
of Constitu-
tional Rights All men
does not deny Equal have certain
others retained protection inalienable
by people of the law rights
ALABAMA (Art. I) §36 §1
ALASKA (Art. I) §21 §§3, 1 §1
ARIZONA (Art. II) §§33, 32 §13
ARKANSAS (Art. II) §29 §§3, 18 §2
CALIFORNIA (Art. I) §23 §21* §1
COLORADO (Art. II) §28 §3
CONNECTICUT (Art. I) §20
DELAWARE (Art. I)
FLORIDA §24 §1
GEORGIA (Art. I) §2-502
HAWAII (Art. I) §20 §4 §2
IDAHO (Art. I) §21 §1
ILLINOIS (Art. II) §1
INDIANA (Art. I) §23* §1
IOWA (Art. I) §25 §6* §1
KANSAS §20 §1
KENTUCKY §1
LOUISIANA (Art. I) §15
MAINE (Art. I) §24 §6A §1
MARYLAND Art. 45
MASSACHUSETTS (Sec. 2) Art. 12 Art. 1
MICHIGAN (Art. I) §23 §2
MINNESOTA (Art. I) §16
MISSISSIPPI (Art. 3) §32
MISSOURI (Art. I) §2
MONTANA (Art. III) §30 §3
NEBRASKA (Art. I) .26 §1
NEVADA (Art. I) §20 §1
NEW HAMPSHIRE (Part First) Arts. 2,4
NEW JERSEY (Art. I) §21 §5 §1
NEW MEXICO (Art. II) §23 §18 §4
NEW YORK (Art. I) §11
NORTH CAROLINA (Art. I) §38 §1
NORTH DAKOTA (Art. I) §20* §1
OHIO (Art. I) §20 §1
OKLAHOMA (Art. II) §33 §2
OREGON (Art. I) §33 §20
PENNSYLVANIA (Art. I) §25 §26 §1
RHODE ISLAND (Art. I) §23
SOUTH CAROLINA (Art. I) §5
SOUTH DAKOTA (Art. VI) §18* §1
TENNESSEE (Art. I)
TEXAS (Art. I)
UTAH (Art. I) §25 §1
VERMONT (Cb. I) Art. 1
VIRGINIA (Art. I) §17 §1
WASHINGTON (Art. I) §30 §12*
WEST VIRGINIA (Art. III) §1
WISCONSIN (Art. I) §1
WYOMING (Art. I) §36 §1
MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION §1.02
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STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS




a defense privilege or
to libel immunity
ALABAMA (Art. I) §12 §22
ALASKA (Art. I)
ARIZONA (Art II) §9
ARKANSAS (Art. II) §6
CALIFORNIA (Art. I) §9
COLORADO (Art. II) §10
CONNECTICUT (Art. I) §6
DELAWARE (Art. I) §5
FLORIDA §13
GEORGIA (Art. I) §2-201
HAWAII (Art. I) §19
IDAHO (Art. I) §2
ILLINOIS (Art. II) §4
INDIANA (Art. I) §10
IOWA (Art. I) §7
KANSAS §11 §2
KENTUCKY §9 §3
LOUISIANA (Art. I) Art. 19, §9
MAINE (Art. I) §4
MARYLAND
MASSACHUSETTS (Sec. 2)
MICHIGAN (Art. I) §19
MINNESOTA (Art. I)
MISSISSIPPI (Art. 3) §13 §6
MISSOURI (Art. I) §8 §3
MONTANA (Art. III) §10 §2
NEBRASKA (Art. 1) §5
NEVADA (Art. I) §9
NEW HAMPSHIRE (Part First)
NEW JERSEY (Art. I) §6
NEW MEXICO (Art. II) §17
NEW YORK (Art. I) §8
NORTH CAROLINA (Art. I)
NORTH DAKOTA (Art. I) §9 §20
OHIO (Art. I) §11
OKLAHOMA (Art. II) §22
OREGON (Art. I)
PENNSYLVANIA (Art. I)
RHODE ISLAND (Art. I) §20
SOUTH CAROLINA (Art. I) §21
SOUTH DAKOTA (Art. VI) §5 §12
TENNESSEE (Art. I) §19*
TEXAS (Art. I) §8*




WEST VIRGINIA (Art. III) §8
WISCONSIN (Art. I) §3
WYOMING (Art. I) §20
MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION
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MISCELLANEOUS STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Provisions for verdict less than unanimous in Civil Actions
Alaska § 16, Ariz. § 23, Ark. § 7, Colo. § 23, Hawaii § 10, Idaho § 7, Mich. § 14,
Minn. § 4, Mo. § 22A, Mont. § 23, Neb. § 6, Nev. § 3, N.M. § 12, N.Y. § 2, Ohio § 5,
Okla. §19 (Misdms. also), S. D. § 6, Utah § 10, Wash. § 22, Wis. § 5.
Civil Juries less than twelve
Cal. § 7 (misd. crime, also), Va. § 11 & 8 (misdms.).
No sex discrimination for service on jury
Colo. § 23, Hawaii § 12, N.C. § 19, Wash. § 21.
Witnesses shall not be unreasonably detained
Ark. § 9, Cal. § 6, Colo. § 17, Fla. § 8, Mich. § 16, Mont. § 17, Nev. § 6, N. D. § 6,
S.C. § 19, Wyo. § 12.
No costs except on conviction
Ga. § 2-110, N.C. § 10.
No abuse of person under arrest and/or in jail
Ga. § 2-109, Ind. § 15, Ore. § 13, Tenn. § 13, Utah § 9, Wyo. § 16.
No intereference with lawful exercise of suffrage
Ariz. § 21, Colo. § 5, Idaho § 19, Mo. § 25, Neb. § 22, N.M. § 8, Okla. § 4, Pa. § 5,
S. D. § 19, Wash. § 19.
No property qualification for office
Colo. § 24, Idaho § 20, Minn. § 17, N.C. § 22, R.I. § 11, Utah § 4.
Right to Appeal




N.C. § 27, Wyo. § 23.
No citizen exiled
Ala. § 30, Kan. § 12, Neb. § 15, Ohio § 12, Okla. § 29, Tex. § 20, Vt. § 21, W. Va.
§ 5.
Alien's bona fide residents same rights as native born citizens
Ala. § 31, Ark. § 20, Colo. § 27, Mont. § 25, N.M. § 22*, Ore. § 31*, S. D. § 14,
Wis. § 15, Wyo. § 29.
No limitation on damages for personal injury or death
Ariz. § 31, N.Y. § 16 (death only), Ohio § 19(a)* (death only).
Unqualified right to work
Fla. § 12, Mo. § 29*, N.D. § 23, S.D. § 2, Wyo. § 22*.
Right of Employees to organize
Mo. § 29, N.Y. § 17.
Representation shall be apportioned according to population
Nev. § 13, S. C. § 2.*
Conscientious Objection permitted
N.H. Art. 13, Vt. Art. 9.
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